



Salford City Council
Supplementary Planning Document
Design and Crime
Adopted 19th July 2006

Preface

This document can be provided in large print, audio, electronic and Braille formats. Please contact Spatial Planning 0161 793 3782.

إذا احتجت للمساعدة في فهم هذه النشرة , برجاء الاتصال بفريق المساواة في مجلس سالفورد,
هاتف رقم 0161 793 3536

এই পুস্তিকাটি বোঝার জন্য যদি আপনার সাহায্যের প্রয়োজন হয় তাহলে সেনফোর্টে কাউন্সিলের ইকুয়ালিটি টিমের সঙ্গে যোগাযোগ করুন টেলিফোন নম্বর 0161 793 3536

如果您有關於本宣傳頁的任何問題，請聯繫 Salford 理事會的 Equalities 團隊，電話號碼為 0161 793 3536

જો આ લીફલેટ સમજવા મોટ તમને મદદની જરૂરત હોય, કૃપો કરી ઇકવાલિટીજ ટીમ સર્વોર્ડ કાઉન્સિલનો ટેલિફોન નમ્બર 0161 793 3536 પર સંપર્ક કરો.

ਜੇ ਤੁਹਾਨੂੰ ਇਸ ਲੀਫਲੈਟ ਨੂੰ ਸਮਝਣ ਵਿਚ ਸਹਾਇਤਾ ਦੀ ਜ਼ਰੂਰਤ ਹੈ, ਤਾਂ ਕਿਰਪਾ ਕਰਕੇ ਸਾਲਫੋਰਡ ਕੌਂਸਲ (Salford council) ਵਿਚ ਇਕੁਅਲਿਟੀ ਟੀਮ (Equalities Team) ਨਾਲ ਫੋਨ ਨੰਬਰ 0161 793 3536 'ਤੇ ਸੰਪਰਕ ਕਰੋ।

اگر آپ کو اس لیف لیٹ کے سمجھنے میں مدد کی ضرورت ہو تو براہ کرم اکونٹیٹیو ٹیم کو سلفورڈ کونسل سے اس ٹیلی فون نمبر 0161 793 3536 پر رابطہ قائم کر سکتے ہیں۔

Equality Impact Assessment

In accordance with the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, a first stage Equality Impact Assessment has been carried out on the draft SPD. This concluded that a more detailed appraisal was not required, as the SPD has no significant differential impact on any group.

The assessment is available on the council's website (www.salford.gov.uk/designandcrimespd)

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1 Introduction

- 1.1** Salford City Council adopted this Supplementary Planning Document (SPD) on 19th July 2006, to provide detailed guidance on designing out crime for new developments.
- 1.2** The SPD has been prepared to give guidance on the design and layout of the physical environment so as to reduce crime, the fear of crime and anti-social behaviour for the whole of Salford. This SPD expands on the policies of the City of Salford Unitary Development Plan (adopted June 2006)⁽ⁱ⁾. The SPD does not have the same status as the development plan but, once adopted, will be a material consideration in the determination of planning applications.
- 1.3** This document is intended to complement, rather than duplicate, other planning documents. Details of all of the planning documents currently in force within the city, and a timetable for the adoption of new documents, are set out in the Council's adopted Local Development Scheme⁽ⁱⁱ⁾
- 1.4** The SPD specifically supplements the following policies of the Adopted UDP:
- **DES10 Design and Crime**

i City Salford Unitary Development Plan (adopted June 2006). [www.salford.gov.uk/udpproposed]
ii Salford City Council, Local Development Scheme, 2006/7-2008/9 [www.salford.gov.uk/localdevscheme]

2 Design and Crime and the Need for this Document

- 2.1** Crime and the fear of crime can have a significant impact on the quality of life of individuals and the wider community. The causes of crime and anti-social behaviour are complex and the reduction and prevention of crime depends on a wide range of measures. Whilst the planning system cannot solve the problem of crime it can play a key role in achieving attractive and well-managed environments which can influence the level of criminal and anti-social activity. Planning also has an important role to play in reducing social exclusion, a key factor influencing crime levels.
- 2.2** The Supplementary Planning Document (SPD) will be used to help assess and determine planning applications and is intended to guide architects, developers, landscape architects and urban designers in designing out crime. It is important that community safety considerations should be an inherent part of the design process, and should inform development at an early stage. The SPD supports Policy DES11 of the adopted City of Salford UDP and aims to complement Salford's Crime and Disorder Strategy and the Police's "Secured By Design" initiative.
- 2.3** Although this SPD is aimed primarily at new development, it is also of relevance to existing developments and owners and occupiers are encouraged to introduce crime prevention measures wherever appropriate and practical.
- 2.4** The Design and Crime SPD should be read in conjunction with other design guidance including the design policies contained within Chapter 6 of the adopted City of Salford UDP. It should be noted that the objectives of improved security and the need for good design might sometimes conflict with each other. Where such installations are considered necessary (e.g. security fencing) and no other design solutions are appropriate, then conditions will be used to mitigate their impact (e.g. polyester powder coating).

POLICY CONTEXT

- 2.5 PPS1: Delivering Sustainable Development** puts crime prevention at the centre of the planning process. Other National Planning Policy underlines the importance of designing out crime and designing in community safety including, PPG3 (Housing), PPS6 (Planning for Town Centres), PPG13 (Transport) and PPG17 (Open Space, Sport and Recreation).
- 2.6 Regional Spatial Strategy for the North West (RSS)** includes amongst its core development principles in policy DP3, a requirement for good design quality in new development. It proposes that local authorities should set out guidance to ensure more innovative design to create high quality living and working environments which incorporate, amongst other things, community safety and "designing out" of crime.
- 2.7** The Government's guide '**Safer Places – The Planning System and Crime Prevention**' sets out a number of key principles and lists 7 attributes of sustainable communities that are particularly relevant to crime prevention. These are embodied in the SPD and are set out below:
- **Access and movement:** places with well defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security;
 - **Structure:** places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict;
 - **Surveillance:** places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked;

Design and Crime and the Need for this Document

- **Ownership:** places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community;
- **Physical protection:** places that include necessary, well-designed security features;
- **Activity:** places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a reduced risk of crime and a sense of safety at all times; and
- **Management and maintenance:** places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and the future.

2.8 Adopted City of Salford UDP **Policy DES10** states that:

Development will not be permitted unless it is designed to discourage crime, anti-social behaviour and the fear of crime, and support personal and property security.

In particular, development should:

- Clearly delineate public, communal, semi-private and private spaces, avoiding ill-defined or left over spaces;**
- Allow natural surveillance, particularly of surrounding public spaces, means of access, and parking areas;**
- Avoid places of concealment and inadequately lit areas; and**
- Encourage activity within public areas.**

Crime prevention measures should not be at the expense of the overall design quality, and proposals will not be permitted where they would have a hostile appearance or engender a fortress-type atmosphere.

Reasoned Justification

Crime and the fear of crime have a major impact on the quality of life, and their minimisation will be an essential part in attracting people to live in the conurbation and in creating sustainable communities. It is therefore vital that planning and design do all they can to minimise opportunities for crime, whilst ensuring that other planning objectives are not compromised. A Supplementary Planning Document (SPD) on Design and Crime is currently being produced to provide detailed guidance to complement this policy. The Design and Crime Act requires the City Council to consider the crime and disorder implications when determining planning applications.

The incorporation of crime reduction measures and designs that have a hostile appearance can actually contribute to crime, for example by giving the impression that an area is not safe or reducing casual surveillance, discouraging further investment. Such proposals will therefore be restricted. Shutters and other security features should be designed as an integral part of development, with the former preferably being located inside rather than outside windows.

Surveillance may be provided in a number of ways, for example, through the avoidance of blank frontages; the positioning of doors and windows so as to overlook public spaces; a mix of uses that encourage activity throughout the day; the minimisation of visual obstacles; and the use of CCTV and adequate lighting. Rear gardens should normally be avoided adjacent to public spaces, because they provide no casual surveillance of places of concealment.

THE NEED FOR A MULTI AGENCY APPROACH

- 2.9** Reducing crime is a key aim of central government and the **Crime and Disorder Act 1998** imposes a duty upon local authorities, police, city-wide public agencies and other local community partnerships to produce a three-year 'Community Safety Strategy'. The basic aim is to reduce crime and disorder levels throughout each respective area. Section 17 of the 1998 Act places a responsibility upon the local authority and police to consider the crime and disorder implications of every aspect of their activities and the need to do all they reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder in their area.
- 2.10 The Salford Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership** is made up of public and private agencies each playing their part to reduce crime and disorder in Salford. The partners include the city council, the police, fire and health services, criminal justice and probation services, the Chamber of Commerce, the Youth Offending Team and the Drug Action Team. The aim of the strategy is to make Salford a safer place for people to live, work and visit and to encourage the development of community based safety plans. One of the key focuses is the involvement of the whole community to combat crimes including the public sector, voluntary sector and commercial organisations.
- 2.11 Secured by Design** is a police initiative to encourage the building industry to incorporate crime prevention measures into the design of developments to assist in reducing the opportunities for crime and the fear of crime. Greater Manchester Police (GMP) offer certification for developments that satisfy the Secured by Design principles. Such a certificate can be used as evidence to show that all reasonable steps have been taken to design out crime within a development. **DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE NOT TAKEN ACCOUNT OF THE NEED TO DESIGN OUT CRIME MAY BE REFUSED PLANNING PERMISSION.** Therefore, we strongly recommend that GMP are contacted before any application is submitted. Their contact details can be found at the end of this document.
- 2.12** Applications that fall within the categories found below will be sent to the GMP Architectural Liaison Unit for formal consultation. Therefore, it is essential that they are contacted for advice prior to the submission of any such application:

Residential:

- New housing estates, infill developments, flat developments and flat conversions where 6 units or more are created.
- New Build schemes or conversions for supported housing e.g. rest homes, nursing homes and hostels.
- Change of use from office to multiple occupancy.
- New build student accommodation.
- Conversion to student accommodation where 10 units or more are created

Office / Industrial / Warehousing:

- Any scheme where 100sq. m gross or more of floor space is created.

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Retail

- Any development or conversion resulting in 100sq. m gross or more of floor space.

Other Commercial

- Any development creating new Class A3, A4 or A5 uses or significant extensions thereof.
- Banks and Building Societies.
- Cash Machines.
- Hotels.
- Guest Houses / Bed and Breakfast establishments.
- Clubs / Discos.
- Petrol filling stations.
- Taxi / Private hire operations.

Community Facilities

- All schools.
- All healthcare facilities.
- Community centres / Meeting halls.
- Places of worship.
- Day nurseries / crèches.

Leisure / Recreation

- All new leisure / recreation facilities, both public and private, or significant extensions thereof.

Transport

- New train /tram stations or significant alterations / extensions to existing facilities.
- New bus / coach stations or significant alterations / extensions to existing facilities.
- New roads.
- New cycleways.
- All free standing and multi storey car parks.

Other

- Contractor's compounds relating to major projects.
- Boundary fences / walls etc. where security is a major issue.

3 Process for Producing this Document

Overview

- 3.1** This SPD has been produced in accordance with the advice contained in PPS12: Local Development Frameworks⁽ⁱ⁾, and the requirements of the Town and Country Planning (Local Development) (England) Regulations 2004⁽ⁱⁱ⁾.

Sustainability Appraisal

- 3.2** The document has been subject to a Sustainability Appraisal⁽ⁱⁱⁱ⁾ (SA) at all stages. The SA considers the implications of the SPD from social, economic and environmental perspectives by assessing options and the draft SPD against available baseline data and sustainability objectives.
- 3.3** A copy of the SA is available on the Council's website (www.salford.gov.uk/designandcrimespd).

Consultation and Public Involvement

- 3.4** A Consultation Statement^(iv) is available on the Council's website which sets out who has been consulted in the preparation of this SPD, how they were consulted, a summary of the main issues raised, and how those issues have been addressed.
- 3.5** All of the consultation activity has provided a significant amount of information that has fed into the production of this SPD.

i PPS12: Local Development Frameworks. HMSO, 2005. [www.odpm.gov.uk]

ii Town and Country Planning (Local Development) (England) Regulations 2004. [www.odpm.gov.uk]

iii Design and Crime SPD: Sustainability Appraisal [www.salford.gov.uk/designandcrimespd]

iv Design and Crime SPD: Consultation Statement [www.salford.gov.uk/designandcrimespd]

General Principles

4 General Principles

- 4.1** Crime and the fear of crime have a considerable impact on both the life of individuals and their wider community. It is well documented that good planning and design have a major role to play in reducing crime and thus people's fear of it.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

- 4.2** Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design is an approach to crime prevention which aims to design a physical environment that positively influences human behaviour. Its goal is to make people feel safe within their built environment and, conversely, make criminals feel at risk and therefore less inclined to commit crime.
- 4.3** The approach has at its core the following principles: defensible space; defined areas of influence (territoriality); and surveillance. All of these principles must be considered and implemented in any development.

Defensible Space

- 4.4** The idea behind defensible space is that the environment is divided into clearly defined areas which are either public, semi-private or private zones. Public zones are generally accessible to anyone and as such represent the least secure of the three zones, particularly when they are located near to a building (as in the case of a footpath). Semi private zones serve to create a defensible buffer between public and private areas. They are accessible to the public but design features establish definite transitional boundaries between the zones. A courtyard is an example of a semiprivate zone. Private zones are areas of restricted entry. Access is controlled and limited to specific individuals or groups. An example of a private zone is a rear garden area within the curtilage of a private dwelling.



Picture 4.1 Semi private zone demarcated by a change in road surface along with symbolic pillars and railings

- 4.5** Divisions between zones are usually defined by some type of barrier which can either be physical or symbolic. For example, a physical barrier can simply be a strong fence or some form of landscaping (this landscaping should not be so dense as to provide a hiding place for criminals). A symbolic barrier can incorporate several features such as a flowerbed or simply a change of surface material or colour on a footpath. The important requirement is that people are left in no doubt that a transition between zones has occurred. Well-defined defensible space empowers occupants to exercise responsibility and control over their environment.

Defined Area of Influence (Territoriality)

- 4.6** Territoriality is fostered by architecture that allows for easy identification of certain areas as the exclusive domain of a particular group or individual. A sense of pride and ownership is usually evident (although ownership in this context does not necessarily mean legal ownership). It can be a perceived ownership that is based on an individual's/group's relationship with the environment. Local children may, for example, feel they "own" a play area simply because they regularly use it.

Surveillance

- 4.7** Natural surveillance is an important mechanism in minimizing crime and complements the protection of a defensible space. Criminals feel least comfortable in environments where legitimate users of a space or building have a high degree of visual control. In other words, their criminal activity can be easily witnessed.
- 4.8** Surveillance can take two forms: natural and formal. Natural surveillance arises where designers minimise visual obstacles and eliminate places of concealment allowing open surveillance opportunities as people go about their normal daily lives. Designs that promote natural surveillance also encourage use of a particular area given that people feel safer in places where they can see and be seen. Formal surveillance measures are employed when natural surveillance alone cannot sufficiently protect an area. Measures might include CCTV and security patrols and are often used in public areas of buildings accessible after business hours.
- 4.9** Generally, surveillance will be improved if greater use is made of an area or building. This can be achieved through a combination of high quality design, encouraging mixed use development and ensuring access to facilities.

5 Crime Prevention Plans

Policy DC 1

CRIME PREVENTION PLAN

All planning applications for developments within the following categories should be accompanied by a Crime Prevention Plan:

- Residential development (new or conversions) where six or more units are created.
- Change of use from office to multiple occupancy.
- New build student accommodation.
- Conversion to student accommodation where 10 units or more are created.
- Any retail scheme where 100sq. m gross of floor space is created or three units is created.
- All cash machines located within or outside a building in public space.
- Hotels.
- All schools.
- All Health Care facilities.
- All new leisure / recreation facilities, both public and private, or significant extensions thereof.

The Crime Prevention Plan should set out how the development will achieve an appropriate standard of security. It should be based on the Secured By Design Initiative, and therefore advice from the GMP Architectural Liaison Unit should be sought in its production.

Reasoned Justification

It is important to ensure that issues relating to crime, the fear of crime, and crime prevention inform the design of developments and are taken into account when determining planning applications. The submission of a Crime Prevention Plan with an application will help to ensure that sufficient information is available on these issues for decision makers to assess whether appropriate prevention measures have been incorporated into any proposal. Where crime may be an important consideration for developments outside the categories listed in the policy, then it may also be appropriate for the applicant to submit information on this matter.

Please note that if the necessary Crime Prevention Plan is not received then your application may be refused on grounds of insufficient information.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

6 Layout

- 6.1** The importance of providing people with secure environments that are well served by permeable routes which are safe, overlooked, well illuminated and pedestrian friendly cannot be overstated. However, footpaths which do not serve a reasonable purpose and which create conduits for crime should be avoided. Land use planning can play its part in achieving this sense of security by promoting good layout and design.

Policy DC 2

FOOTPATHS, WALKWAYS AND DEDICATED CYCLE ROUTES

Footpaths, walkways and dedicated cycle routes should:

- **Be located so as to encourage maximum use;**
- **Be as short and direct as practicable;**
- **Be as wide as practicable;**
- **Have clear lines of sight into, along, and out of them;**
- **Benefit from natural surveillance from surrounding buildings;**
- **Be designed to incorporate boundary treatments that allow views from adjoining spaces into them, and vice versa subject to privacy considerations;**
- **Incorporate barriers where necessary to prevent vehicular access;**
- **Be illuminated to a uniform level to allow easy recognition of other people, whilst protecting the amenity of surrounding occupiers and ensuring that drivers are not dazzled;**
- **Be well-maintained; and**
- **Be clearly signposted.**

Footpaths, walkways and dedicated cycle routes should be where practicable designed to ensure that there are no:

- **Sharp corners, tunnels or places of concealment;**
- **Sections to the rear of buildings where practicable;**
- **Areas obscured by planting or landscaping; or**
- **Narrow sections that are enclosed by high walls.**

Reasoned Justification

Layouts that encourage walking and cycling, and which allow for easy access by the provision of secure through-routes, in accordance with UDP Policy DES2, also provide for greater natural surveillance because of the increased flow of people. However, care should be taken to ensure that such routes are well-designed so as to minimize opportunities for crime along them. They should be well-maintained (e.g. by preventing natural foliage from overgrowing), and there should be no areas that could provide increased opportunities for crime and anti-social behaviour.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

Policy DC 3

FRONT OF BUILDINGS

New developments should normally be designed so that the main access to the building is visible from the street and the front of buildings face the most public side of the site.

Reasoned Justification

Buildings should be of a design that ensures that surveillance of the public realm is maximized. In part, this can be achieved by designing developments with the main frontages of buildings facing the most public side (however, care should be taken to provide natural surveillance from all elevations of a new building). For the purposes of this policy, the 'most public side' is defined as the side which experiences the greatest level of pedestrian and vehicular activity. Normally, this would be the main public highway. Maximising natural surveillance will reduce the opportunities for concealment and promote a sense of safety for users and passers by. By designing a development with the front of buildings, which incorporate the main entrances, facing the most public side will also enhance the legibility of the street scene and will generate greater activity in the public realm.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.



Picture 6.1 Residential development indicating the good practise of the front of dwellings facing their most public side

Policy DC 4

PRIVATE SPACES BEHIND BUILDINGS

Where possible, gardens, yards and other private spaces at the rear of the buildings they relate to should back on to land or buildings that are themselves secure.

Reasoned Justification

Private spaces must be well-defined. They should normally be behind buildings, be enclosed and have lockable gates with access restricted to the users of the associated building. This will impede burglars from gaining access to the back of properties where there is usually less surveillance. Private spaces that interlock with adjacent private spaces or which back onto buildings provide for the best security. Where possible, they should be protected by a boundary whose security is commensurate with the location of the building.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

Policy DC 5

MAINTENANCE OF SPACES

All space within a development should be properly managed and maintained and this should be reflected in their design.

Reasoned Justification

Neglected land (particularly where its ownership is ambiguous) is likely to attract antisocial or criminal activity. Spaces should be well-defined to help increase a sense of ownership for land. For example, semi-private spaces, such as front gardens, should be defined by a low wall or hedge. Where a problem of anti-social activity exists on an established development, steps should be taken to improve the design and maintenance of the land.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

Policy DC 6

MIXED-USE DEVELOPMENT

The layout of uses in mixed-use developments should seek to maximise natural surveillance and pedestrian activity.

Reasoned Justification

Mixed use developments should normally be located within key centres as defined in the UDP. Where mixed use developments are acceptable careful integration and balancing of mixture of uses within residential layouts, for example, can have a positive effect on them. A mixture of local shopping, leisure, work and community facilities served by good public transport, can mean that areas benefit from greater surveillance by those using the various facilities. It also makes for more sustainable developments.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

6.2

PHOTOGRAPH OF MIXED USE DEVELOPMENT TO BE ADDED HERE

Policy DC 7

DELIVERY AREAS

Where delivery areas are positioned at the rear of commercial developments, they should have restricted and gated access.

Reasoned Justification

Delivery areas pose an attractive target for criminals, particularly if no natural surveillance, e.g. gate house or formal surveillance such as CCTV is installed. Therefore, it is important that access to delivery areas is limited to authorised personnel.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

7 Building Design

Policy DC 8


NATURAL SURVEILLANCE

Buildings should be designed to ensure that surveillance of the public realm is maximized.

Reasoned Justification

Maximising natural surveillance will reduce the opportunities for concealment and promote a sense of safety for users and passers by. Natural surveillance can be maximized, for example, through the incorporation of active frontages. Buildings on a corner, for example, should be designed to provide surveillance on all public sides. Commercial buildings should be orientated so that all means of access are subject to some form of surveillance.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.



Picture 7.1 This building is designed with windows on both the front and side elevations so as to afford good surveillance

Policy DC 9

BUILDING ENTRANCES

Each building should have a private entrance from the street where practicable. If communal entrances are unavoidable, secure access controls should be provided to restrict access to occupiers and authorised visitors.

Reasoned Justification

Building entrances should be designed to prevent access from people who are not associated with the development in order to prevent criminal activity. Entrances to buildings should be visible from windows within the building so as to aid identification of callers. In addition, secure entrances can be achieved through the use of, for example, intercom systems, CCTV, staffed security, key-pads and other robust access control systems.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

Policy DC 10

EXTENSIONS

Building extensions should neither obscure entrances nor facilitate easy access to upper floor windows.

Reasoned Justification

In order to reduce the opportunity for criminal activity extensions should not obscure entrances, as this could result in concealed areas which could encourage criminal activity. Furthermore, extensions should be designed in such a way that they restrict access to upper floors. For example, flat roofs should be avoided as they can provide a platform for criminals to gain access through windows. This is particularly important for extensions at the rear of buildings where natural surveillance from the public realm is limited.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

Policy DC 11

BUILDING FABRIC

The type and specification of materials which make up the building fabric should, wherever possible, be certified secure products. In particular, windows and doors should satisfy BS 7950, LPS 1175, and PAS024 standards.

Reasoned Justification

In order to reduce crime and the fear of crime and to compliment the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, careful attention is required on the design and specification of the building fabric. For further guidance on the standards set out in this policy, developers are advised to contact the Greater Manchester Police Architectural Liaison Officers and Crime Reduction Advisors whose details can be found in the Useful Contacts section of this document.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

Policy DC 12

PROTECTING COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS

The design of commercial buildings should incorporate measures to deter external attack. Where necessary and consistent with other design objectives, additional measures should also be installed such as laminate glass to accessible windows and doors, bollards and barriers.

Reasoned Justification

Commercial buildings, because they are often vacant in the evening and because they can house expensive equipment and/or goods, are prime targets for criminals. Design features such as stall risers can reduce unauthorised vehicular access through shop windows. Wherever possible consideration should be given to the use of certified enhanced security products (e.g. LPS 1175). The use of deep overhanging eaves, the internal positioning of piping, and the avoidance of roof lights can all help to prevent illegal access via the roof. Where roof lights are unavoidable, internal grilles should be used to prevent illegal access.

Commercial properties can be particularly vulnerable to burglary and vandalism outside hours of operation. Where windows exist or are planned, thought should be given to fitting laminated glass to those on the ground floor.

For further guidance on these standards set out in this policy, developers are advised to contact the Greater Manchester Police Architectural Liaison Officers and Crime Reduction Advisors whose details can be found in the Useful Contacts section of this document.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.



Picture 7.2 Bollards preventing vehicular access to a public square

Policy DC 13

INTERNAL DESIGN

Where possible, sensitive areas and expensive equipment within buildings should be located on upper floors.

Reasoned Justification

Some buildings are prime targets for criminals and therefore it is important to locate sensitive areas and expensive equipment (e.g. dedicated IT suites) within buildings on upper floors or away from areas susceptible to casual observers, where it is more difficult for criminals to access.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

Policy DC 14

SECURITY SHUTTERS AND GRILLES

Security shutters and their housing boxes should normally be fitted internally. They should also be powder coated in an appropriate colour and perforated. Where grilles are deemed necessary, they should also be fitted internally and be powder coated in an appropriate colour. Security shutters and grilles should satisfy LPS 1175.

Reasoned Justification

Security shutters or grilles may be appropriate where the risk of crime cannot be satisfactorily reduced by other measures. The design of shutters and grilles is, however, very important. Solid, faceless aluminium/steel shutters or grilles serve only to engender a fortress type atmosphere and provide a vulnerable target for graffiti. The Council will, therefore, normally require that shutters and grilles are powder coated with shutters also being perforated. Apart from being more attractive, shutters, if internally located and illuminated from behind, allow for surveillance from the street. External shutters, their housing boxes and grilles that stand proud of the front of buildings are not normally acceptable.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

Advice on Shutter Design (External Fitting)




Figure 7.1 Policy DC 14: The top example is not acceptable, the second example is the first choice and the third example is acceptable

7.1 PHOTO OF INTERNALLY FITTED PERFORATED ROLLER SHUTTER TO BE ADDED HERE

8 Lighting

Policy DC 15

LIGHTING

Within residential areas, the relative crime risk of the area shall be determined in consultation with the Greater Manchester Architectural Liaison Unit in order for appropriate lighting classes to be derived as per Table B.4 of BS 5489 part 1:2003 and supporting notes. This in turn will yield appropriate lighting levels in accordance with Table 3 of BS EN 13201 Part 2:2003. Shadowed areas and glare affecting the visibility of lit areas should be avoided.

Within commercial areas and especially where car parking exists, lighting should be provided to the levels set out in BS 5489 Part 9:1996 Table 5 and should be operated from dusk to dawn. If, in consultation with the Greater Manchester Architectural Liaison Unit, a significant crime risk exists, then the lighting uniformity ratio should not be less than 0.25.

Lighting units should be robustly constructed and carefully positioned so as to reduce the potential for vandalism.

Landscaping should be designed appropriately and maintained to avoid lights being obscured or the creation of deep shadows.

Reasoned Justification

Appropriate lighting can discourage crime and reduce the fear of crime as it removes hiding places for criminals and improves visibility for users. In order to ensure that lighting does not impact on the amenity of users and neighbouring users, for example, by lighting shining directly into windows, careful siting and orientation is necessary. Care should also be taken with regard to the reflective nature of some surfaces due to the potential for a detrimental impact on highway safety. The use of time switches, photocells, passive infra red movement detectors and remote electronic monitoring systems can reduce the need for lighting to be on at all times, which in turn can reduce electricity bills and carbon dioxide emissions. Furthermore, in order to reduce the risk and fear of crime, it is essential that lighting schemes are completed prior to first occupation of developments.

For further guidance on the standards set out in the policy, developers are advised to contact the Greater Manchester Police Architectural Liaison Officers and Crime Reduction Advisors whose details can be found in the Useful Contacts section of this document.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

9 Boundary Treatments and Alley Gating

Policy DC 16

BOUNDARY TREATMENTS

Boundary treatments should maximize natural surveillance where appropriate and should be designed to a high standard.

Reasoned Justification

Appropriate boundary treatments, such as fencing, walls or landscaping, clearly define spaces and provide physical barriers which deter criminal activity. However, it is important that boundary treatments do not result in fortress-like development, as this can lead to a hostile environment and an increase in fear of crime. Boundary treatments should normally be visually permeable, for example railings, so that no hiding places are created for criminals. Non-permeable boundary treatments may be appropriate where private spaces are being created, for example, private gardens. With regard to fences and railings, they should be powder coated in an appropriate colour so that they make a positive contribution to the character of the surrounding area. The use of protruded top railings can help deter climbing. Further guidance on the use of security fencing is contained within appendix 1.

Railings, when erected on top of dwarf walls, should be flush with the edge of the wall so that criminals cannot use the wall as a foothold as a means of scaling them. Defensible planting next to a wall can act as a buffer between the public realm and the boundary. Species that are suitable include holly, hawthorn, firethorn and blackthorn. Planting patterns should not make for easy hiding places for criminals.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.



Picture 9.1 Railings and Landscaping clearly indicate the boundary between the public and private realm

Policy DC 17

PERIMETER GATES

Perimeter gates should be the same height as the boundary fence and should incorporate anti-lift hinges and integrated locks.

Reasoned Justification

Boundary gates, if not designed appropriately, can offer opportunities for criminals to gain access to restricted areas. Their design should make them difficult to climb and, where practicable, they should either be manned or be controlled by authorised personnel - for example, with a lock and key system or an electronically operated "fob" system.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

Policy DC 18

ALLEY GATING

Alley gating should be designed so as to make scaling them difficult and their locks should be protected so as to deter tampering and vandalism. They should be flush with the building line and should allow views through them.

Reasoned Justification

Alley gating can improve security for buildings. It can also encourage ownership of rear alleyways that serve the buildings which in turn can result in better maintenance of the alleyways. It is important, however, that alley gating is designed to an appropriate standard and is vandal proof. Alley gating should not be solid, as this creates blind spaces which can result in increased fear of crime. Recesses can also provide hiding places for criminals and should be avoided.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

Boundary Treatments and Alley Gating



Picture 9.2 Alley gating clearly identifies the boundary between the public and private realm

10 Parking and Traffic Calming

- 10.1** The Council acknowledges that secure car parking is one of the most important factors for both residential and commercial developments. Parking areas do, however, use up a high proportion of urban land and encourage the use of the private car which is in conflict with the principles of sustainable development. Therefore, low levels of car parking is encouraged and car parking and service areas should be carefully located within a development so as to minimise visual impact. In addition, where parking is to be provided it should be in accordance with the requirements contained within Appendix 2 and 3 of the UDP.

Policy DC 19

COMMUNAL CAR PARKING

Communal car parking should normally be located to the rear, underneath or, where appropriately designed, above new development. It should also be located so as to maximise natural surveillance, but without compromising building security. Where possible, access to parking areas should be restricted/controlled with appropriate boundary treatments. Walls and fences surrounding parking areas should be visually permeable to allow a high level of natural surveillance.

Reason Justification

Parking courts can have a propensity to attract crime. Where appropriate, the security of parking areas can be enhanced by ensuring that they are overlooked from as many windows as possible thus providing an element of natural surveillance. It is also important to ensure that landscaping does not obscure surveillance across parking areas. Where surface level parking is necessary, the use of low boundary treatments ensures that natural surveillance is maintained and prevents developments feeling hostile which can increase fear of crime. Parking should ideally have restricted access through the use of measures such as controlled barriers.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

10.2 PHOTO OF WELL DESIGNED CAR PARKING TO BE ADDED HERE

Policy DC 20

TRAFFIC CALMING

Traffic calming schemes should be designed to discourage crime as well as improve traffic and pedestrian safety.

Reasoned Justification

The main purpose of traffic calming is to improve traffic and pedestrian safety, but it can also have a positive effect in reducing crime. If designed correctly, traffic calming measures can create a sense of ownership by identifying territorial boundaries. For example, chicanes can effectively section off different parts of a street or road, particularly if they are appropriately landscaped. If lit, the design should be in accordance with the ILE document Technical Report 25, 'The lighting of traffic calming'.

This policy supplements UDP Policy DES10.

11 Closed Circuit Television CCTV

11.1 CCTV in itself will not reduce crime. It must form part of a package of measures that serve to make for an integrated and collective approach. Important issues such as civil liberties, Data Protection and local acceptance also need to be taken into account when designing a CCTV scheme. This said, CCTV systems can minimise disturbance, vandalism and shoplifting but they must be monitored for them to be effective. Systems should also have a response capability such as “voice over” whereby a person monitoring the system can warn off the would-be criminal. Care should be taken with the positioning of trees as they can obscure the view of cameras particularly when in leaf. Co-ordination between CCTV and lighting proposals will maximise the night time benefits of both.



Picture 11.1 An example of modern CCTV monitoring systems



12 Implementation, Monitoring and Review

Implementation

- 12.1** The provisions of this SPD will be implemented primarily through the development control process and the determination of planning applications. The SPD does not have the status of the development plan (for the purposes of Section 38 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004), but will be an important material consideration in determining planning applications.
- 12.2** Developers are advised to discuss possible schemes with Urban Vision (which provides Salford's development control service on behalf of the city council), at the earliest opportunity, and wherever possible prior to any application being submitted. This will help to ensure that the requirements of this SPD are fully understood and are taken into account.

Monitoring

- 12.3** The effectiveness of the SPD will be assessed each year in Salford's Annual Monitoring Report. This will identify whether there have been any problems in implementing the SPD, and assess whether it is having its intended effect. The key indicators will be:
- "Percentage of people who like the neighbourhood they live in" to act as a proxy.
 - Burglary offences per 1000 population.
 - Vehicle crime offences per 1000 population.
 - Violence against the person per 1000 population.
 - A number of Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPI) may also be relevant when considering the effectiveness of the SPD although the SPD will only be one factor in influencing those indicators.

Review

- 12.4** The assessment of the SPD performance in the Annual Monitoring Report will help to identify if there is any need for the SPD to be reviewed. If a need for the review of the SPD is identified, then a timetable for this process will be included in Salford's Local Development Scheme as resources permit.

13 Further Help and Advice

13.1 This SPD has been written primarily to provide guidance for developers and their agents. It outlines some of the measures that can be incorporated into designs to deter criminal activity. Set out below, however, are agencies/organisations that will give further free professional advice.

Architectural Liaison Unit (ALU)

13.2 The ALU is based within the Greater Manchester Police Force but its officers are recruited from the construction industry professions. Each receives specialist training in criminology, risk management and crime reduction strategies. This training allows officers to give advice on designing out crime for existing, proposed and refurbished developments.

13.3 In particular, officers can also advise on both the Secured By Design Award and Safer Parking Scheme Award. These schemes encourage designers and developers to apply police recommendations for residential, commercial and car parking developments. Research shows that crime can be substantially reduced (with little or no extra cost) by introducing Secured by Design recommendations during the early design and planning stages of a development. A developer who receives one or both of these awards can subsequently use the "Secured By Design" and "Park Mark" logo in their promotional literature.

British Safety Council

13.4 The BSC is responsible for coordinating all aspects of business security and safety matters. Working closely with the ALU and the City Council, the BSC can offer the following services:

- Security surveys;
- Advice on available grants;
- Provision of support services for industrial and commercial Risk Management
- Groups/Business Watch Schemes; and
- Advice on the best products and practices in all aspects of security.

Crime Reduction Advisors

13.5 The CRAs provide advice upon the formulation of strategies that address the causes or common characteristics of policing problems, in order to reduce situational and sociological crime and disorder.

13.6 They keep abreast of crime reduction techniques and identify "what works" in the field of crime reduction.

13.7 The ALU and CRAs also promote Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) both internally and externally. They are able to advise on specialist issues such as CCTV and changing crime trends.

13.8 Finally, they establish links with local crime and disorder partnerships, to promote and advise on crime reduction issues.

Further Help and Advice

Community Fire Safety Team

13.9 The CFST can offer advice on the implications of security measures in relation to fire safety.

Development Control Section

13.10 Pre-application advice is also available from the Council's Development Control Section. Officers will be able to assist developers and their agents both on security and other material matters relating to a proposed application.

Appendix A Useful Contacts

The Architectural Liaison Unit
Divisional and Partnership Support Unit
Greater Manchester Police
Chester House
Boyer Street
Manchester
M16 ORE
Tel: 0161 856 5912
<mailto:architecturalliasionunit@gmp.pnn.police.uk>
<http://www.securedbydesign.com>

The Crime Reduction Advisors (Salford division)
Tel: 0161 856 5254 / 5421

The Crime Reduction Advisors
Tel: 0161 856 5254

The Community Fire Safety Team (Salford Area)
West Area Headquarters
Moor Lane
Bolton
Tel: 01204 905141

Urban Vision
Development Control Section
Emerson House
Albert Street
Eccles
Salford
M30 OTE
Tel: 0161 779 4986

Salford City Council
Spatial Planning
Housing and Planning Directorate
Civic Centre, Chorley Road
Swinton, Salford
M27 2AD
Tel: 0161 793 3782

Appendix B Security Fencing within the Greater Manchester Area

Introduction

B.1 The purpose of this report is to outline Greater Manchester Police (GMP) recommendations for good practice on fencing in sensitive locations such as residential areas having regard to visual amenity as well as security. It should be noted that this is not a definitive guide and that the products referred to are examples only and not recommendations about individual manufactured products.

Considerations

B.2 Preventing access to school buildings by the erection of security fencing is a common and effective solution. But we must recognise the potential risks and install a physical boundary commensurate with the risk.

B.3 There are many different fencing products on the market, which have different costs and effectiveness in terms of security. The most common product is palisade fencing (see below). This type of fencing has predominantly been used around industrial premises and is of a utilitarian appearance.

B.4 Security fencing is sometimes installed around schools at a height of 1.8m - 2.4 meters. At this height, palisade fencing can produce an intimidating appearance and introduce a fear of crime. However, due to its relatively low cost and the perception that it is the most secure fencing product on the market, palisade fencing is frequently used around school premises.

B.5 However, the visual appearance of security fencing is also an important consideration, and as such palisade fencing is often not the most appropriate fencing type to use, especially in sensitive locations such as residential areas.

Guidelines for Types of Fencing

B.6 A weld mesh fence with a high density of mesh is the preferred choice of security fencing in towns and shopping areas. It is aesthetically pleasing, is effective in achieving security, and does not create a harsh environment. It is unlikely, therefore, to generate a fear of crime.

B.7 Weld mesh has a better level of visibility (through the fence) than palisade. Including when viewed at acute angles. It is recognised that it can be a more expensive option than palisade fencing and that cost is a significant factor for schools. Consequently, there may be some situations where an exceptional case may be made for palisade fencing:

- To the rear of service areas remote from the roads and streets backing onto other service areas to e.g. shops.
- Joint boundaries with industrial estates.

Fencing Specifications

- B.8** With regard to palisade fencing, the reference is to 'V' shaped pales, which pass through a pre-punched slot in a horizontal rail at the top and bottom of the fence (intermediate horizontal rails would not be appropriate as the rail would act as a ladder rung to scale the fence). The top of the pailings should only incorporate a single spike and fencing should be polyester powder coated.
- B.9** It is recommended that the specification for palisade fencing should comply with BS 1722 part 12. This will include burial of pales into a concrete sill (150mm) or burial of pales into the ground (400mm) and the fitting of an additional rail 100mm from the bottom of the pales. The steel would be a minimum of 3mm prior to galvanizing.
- B.10** A rivetless specification of palisade fencing is recommended.

Preferred Fencing Types

- B.11** Weld mesh fencing: This is a rigid mesh of wires, which should be welded at each intersection. Their level of security depends on the density of the mesh, that is, the higher the density the more secure the fencing. The wires should be of high tensile strength and so can only be cut using bolt croppers, (too difficult with pliers).
- B.12** A high security specification of weldmesh fencing would be: 4mm dia. Wires at 12mm centres – 4mm dia. vertical wires at (approx) 75mm centres (for example, Bekaert Securifor 358).
- B.13** Alternatively, a fencing system can adopt a horizontal 'V' shaped form at the top and bottom of the fence to improve strength and appearance. This incorporates a 4mm dia. Wire at (approx) 75mm vertical centres & 4mm dia. wire at 12mm centres (for example Bekaert Securifor 3D).

Salford City Council

Spatial Planning

Housing and Planning Directorate
Salford Civic Centre
Chorley Road
Swinton
Salford
M27 5BW

Telephone : 0161 793 3782

E-mail: plans.consultation@salford.gov.uk

Adopted 19th July 2006